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Abstract
This paper studies robust transmission schemes for multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap
channels. Both the cases of direct transmission and cooperative jamming with a helper are investigated
with imperfect channel state information (CSI) for the eavesdropper links. Robust transmit covariance
matrices are obtained based on worst-case secrecy rate maximization, under both individual and global
power constraints. For the case of an individual power constraint, we show that the non-convex maximin
optimization problem can be transformed into a quasiconvex problem that can be efficiently solved with
existing methods. For a global power constraint, the joint optimization of the transmit covariance matrices
and power allocation between the source and the helper is studied via geometric programming. We also
study the robust wiretap transmission problem for the case with a quality-of-service constraint at the
legitimate receiver. Numerical results show the advantage of the proposed robust design. In particular,
for the global power constraint scenario, although cooperative jamming is not necessary for optimal
transmission with perfect eavesdropper’s CSI, we show that robust jamming support can increase the
worst-case secrecy rate and lower the signal to interference-plus-noise ratio at Eve in the presence of
channel mismatches between the transmitters and the eavesdropper.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Secure transmission in wireless networks is required in many applications. Traditionally, security
is considered as an issue addressed above the physical (PHY) layer, and conventional approaches for
ensuring confidentially are usually based on cryptographic methods. However, the broadcast nature of
wireless transmission and the dynamic topology of mobile networks may introduce significant challenges
to secret key transmission and management [1], [2]. Therefore, there has recently been considerable
interest from an information-theoretic perspective in the use of physical layer mechanisms to improve
the security of wireless transmissions.
The theoretical basis of this area was initiated by Wyner, who introduced and studied the wiretap
channel where the eavesdropper’s received signal is a degraded version of the legitimate receiver’s
signal [3]. The secrecy capacity was defined as the upper bound of all achievable secrecy rates, which
guarantee that private messages can be reliably transmitted to the receiver and kept perfectly secret
from the eavesdropper. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner studied a more general non-degraded wiretap channel and
considered transmission of secret messages over broadcast channels [4]. Recently, considerable research
has investigated secrecy in wiretap channels with multiple antennas [5]–[13]. The secrecy capacity of
the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel has been fully characterized in [8] and [11].
In particular, for multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap cannels, the optimal transmit covariance
matrix was found to be single-stream beamforming obtained via a closed-form solution [14], [15]. While
research in this area usually assumes global channel state information (CSI) is available at the transmitter,
some other work has considered the case where only partial information of the eavesdropper CSI (ECSI)
is available. The optimal transmit covariance matrix that achieves the ergodic secrecy capacity for the
MISO wiretap channel was studied in [16], where only statistical ECSI is assumed to be available. In [17]
and [18], the problem was investigated from the perspective of maximizing the worst-case secrecy rate,
where [17] considered the case that the eavesdropper’s channel matrix is trace-bounded but otherwise
unknown, and [18] assumed that the ECSI channel mismatch is norm-bounded.
With the additional degrees of freedom in multi-antenna or multi-node systems, many papers have
considered improving the secrecy rate through the use of artificial interference [5], [13], [19], [20].
In these schemes, in addition to the information signals, part of the transmit power is allocated to
jamming signals that selectively degrade the eavesdropper’s channel while maintaining little interference
to legitimate users. Some recent work has also considered using friendly helpers to provide jamming
signals to confuse the eavesdropper [21]–[28]. This approach is often referred to as cooperative jamming.
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2In [21], a cooperative jamming scheme is proposed for improving the achievable secrecy sum-rate for
general Gaussian multiple access and two-way relay wiretap channels. The optimal transmit weights for
multiple single-antenna helpers were studied in [24], [25], where a global power constraint was imposed.
A similar case with individual power constraints was studied in [27]. In [28], the optimal beamforming
strategy for a cooperative jammer was studied for the MISO case under a zero-forcing constraint that nulls
the interference at the legitimate receiver. However, most of the previous work on cooperative jamming
assumes perfect global channel state information, including CSI for the eavesdropper. This motivates us
to investigate the case when the transmitters (including helpers) have only imperfect ECSI.
In this paper, we study robust transmit precoder design for MISO wiretap channels with and without
a helper. We assume that perfect CSI for the links to the legitimate user is available at both transmitters,
while for the eavesdropper links there exist channel mismatches that are norm-bounded by some known
constants [18], [29], [30]. Following [9], [11], [15], Gaussian inputs are assumed in the paper. We focus
on obtaining robust transmit covariance matrices for 1) direct transmission (DT) without a helper and
2) cooperative jamming (CJ) schemes with a helper (friendly jammer), based on maximizing the worst-
case secrecy rate. Note that our work is different from [18] in that we consider robust transmission for
not only information signals but also jamming signals. We begin by studying the optimization problem
under an individual power constraint, and then focus on the more complicated case with a global power
constraint. For the individual power constraint case, we show that the non-convex maximin problem of
maximizing the worst-case secrecy rate can be converted into a quasiconvex problem that can be efficiently
solved via existing methods. For the global power constraint case, we obtain the jointly optimal transmit
covariance matrices and power allocation between the source and the helper via geometric programming.
In addition, following [19], [20], [31], we also consider the scenario where there is a quality-of-service
(QoS) constraint at the legitimate node. In this case, we show that the introduction of the QoS constraint
simplifies the optimization of the covariance and the power allocation.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the system model considered throughout
the paper. In Section III, robust design of the transmit covariance matrix is studied for the direct
transmission case. The robust cooperative jamming scheme is then investigated in Section IV, where
both individual and global power constraints are considered. Section V studies the case where a QoS
constraint is required at the legitimate destination. The performance of the proposed robust transmission
approaches are studied using several simulation examples in Section VI, and conclusions are drawn in
Section VII.
The following notation is used in the paper: E{·} denotes expectation, (·)H the Hermitian transpose,
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3|| · || the Euclidean norm, (·)† the pseudo-inverse, tr(·) is the trace operator, R(·) represents the range
space of a matrix, and I is an identity matrix of appropriate dimension.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a MISO communication system with a source node (Alice), a helper (Helper), a destination
(Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve). The number of antennas possessed by Alice and the Helper are denoted
by Na and Nh, respectively, while both Bob and Eve are single-antenna nodes. In this model, Alice sends
private messages to Bob in the presence of Eve, who is able to eavesdrop on the link between Alice and
Bob. The Helper can choose to be silent or to transmit artificial interference signals to confuse Eve. Both
cases will be considered in the paper, and we refer to the former case as direct transmission (DT) and
the latter as cooperative jamming (CJ). We assume that Alice and the Helper have perfect CSI for their
links to Bob, but they have only imperfect CSI for their channels to Eve. We will consider cases with
either individual or global power constraints.
A. Direct Transmission
When there is no support from the Helper, the received signals at Bob and Eve are given by
yb = hbx+ nb (1a)
ye = hex+ ne (1b)
where x is the signal vector transmitted by Alice, the covariance matrix of x is denoted byQx = E{xxH},
tr(Qx) ≤ PS where PS is the transmit power constraint on Alice, and {hb,he} are the 1×Na channel
vectors for Bob and Eve, respectively. The terms nb and ne represent naturally occurring noise at Bob
and Eve, and we assume that nb and ne are zero-mean circular complex Gaussian with variance σ2b and
σ2e . We will assume without loss of generality that σ2b = σ2e = σ2.
B. Cooperative Jamming
For the case where the Helper joins the network by transmitting an i.i.d. Gaussian interference signal
z, Bob and Eve then receive
yb = hbx+ gbz+ nb (2a)
ye = hex+ gez+ ne (2b)
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4where we denote Qz = E{zzH} and tr(Qz) ≤ PJ . The cooperative jamming optimization problems
that we consider in the paper will be subject to either an individual power constraint tr(Qx) ≤ PS ,
tr(Qz) ≤ PJ , or to a global power constraint tr(Qz) + tr(Qz) ≤ P .
C. Channel Mismatch
For the channels between the transmitters and Eve, only estimates h˜e and g˜e are available at Alice
and the Helper, respectively. We define the channel error vectors as
eh = he − h˜e (3a)
eg = ge − g˜e, (3b)
and we assume that the channel mismatches lie in the bounded sets Eh = {eh : ||eh||2 ≤ ǫ2h} and
Eg = {eg : ||eg||
2 ≤ ǫ2g}, where ǫh and ǫg are known constants. All the optimization problems in the
paper are based on the e∗h ∈ Eh and e∗g ∈ Eg that give the worst performance.
III. ROBUST DIRECT TRANSMISSION
In this section, we consider the scenario where there is no jamming support from the Helper. According
to the signal model (1) and (3), the secrecy rate is [9]
Rs = log2
(
1 +
1
σ2
hbQxh
H
b
)
− log2
(
1 +
1
σ2
(h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜
H
e + eh)
)
. (4)
A power constraint is imposed such that Qx ∈ Qx = {Qx : Qx  0, tr(Qx) ≤ PS}. For the case where
perfect ECSI is available, the optimal Qx has been found to be unit-rank and the corresponding beam-
former is the generalized eigenvector of the matrix pencil (σ2I+PShHb hb, σ2I+PShHe he) corresponding
to the largest generalized eigenvalue [9], [15].
We consider the case where Alice does not have perfect knowledge of the channel to Eve, but only
an estimate h˜e. We focus on optimizing the worst-case performance, where we maximize the secrecy
rate for the worst channel mismatch eh in the bounded set Eh. Therefore, the optimization problem (4)
becomes
max
Qx∈Qx
min
eh∈Eh
σ2 + hbQxh
H
b
σ2 + (h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜e + eh)H
. (5)
The difficulty in solving this problem comes from the inner minimization over eh. As will be discussed
later, the minimization is actually a non-convex problem. However, we will show that through a proper
transformation, problem (5) can be converted to a solvable quasiconvex optimization problem.
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5Proposition 1: Problem (5) is equivalent to the following problem
min
Qx,µ,Ψ
σ2 + µǫ2h + tr[(Qx +Ψ)h˜
H
e h˜e]
σ2 + tr(QxhHb hb)
(6a)
s.t.

 Ψ Qx
Qx µINa −Qx

  0 (6b)
tr(Qx) ≤ PS (6c)
Qx  0, µ ≥ 0. (6d)
Proof: The maximin problem in (5) can be transformed to
max
Qx∈Qx,v
σ2 + hbQxh
H
b
v
(7a)
s.t. σ2 + (h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜e + eh)H ≤ v (7b)
ehe
H
h ≤ ǫ
2
h, (7c)
where the constraints can also be expressed as
− ehQxe
H
h − 2Re(h˜eQxeHh )− h˜eQxh˜He − σ2 + v ≥ 0 (8)
− ehe
H
h + ǫ
2
h ≥ 0. (9)
Using the S-procedure [32], we know that there exists an eh ∈ CNa satisfying both the above inequalities
if and only if there exists a µ ≥ 0 such that
 µINa −Qx −Qxh˜He
−h˜eQx −h˜eQxh˜
H
e − σ
2 − µǫ2h + v

  0. (10)
Then we can use the property of the generalized Schur complement [33] and rewrite (10) as
σ2 + µǫ2h + h˜eQxh˜
H
e + h˜eQx(µINa −Qx)
†Qxh˜
H
e ≤ v. (11)
Therefore, the maximin problem in (5) becomes
max
Qx∈Qx,µ≥0
σ2 + hbQxh
H
b
σ2 + µǫ2h + h˜eQxh˜
H
e + h˜eQx(µINa −Qx)
†Qxh˜He
(12)
which is equivalent to
max
Qx∈Qx,µ≥0,Ψ
σ2 + hbQxh
H
b
σ2 + µǫ2h + h˜eQxh˜
H
e + h˜eΨh˜
H
e
(13)
s.t. Qx(µINa −Qx)
†Qx  Ψ. (14)
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6Next, we use the Schur complement to convert (14) into a linear matrix inequality (LMI), and the
maximization problem is then given by
min
Qx∈Qx,µ≥0,Ψ
σ2 + µǫ2h + tr[(Qx +Ψ)h˜
H
e h˜e]
σ2 + tr(QxhHb hb)
(15a)
s.t.

 Ψ Qx
Qx µINa −Qx

  0, (15b)
which completes the proof.
Problem (6) consists of a linear fractional objective function, which is thus quasiconvex, with a set of
LMI constraints. Therefore, we can solve this problem efficiently via the bisection method [32]. We first
form the epigraph problem for (6) as
min
Qx,µ,Ψ
t (16a)
s.t. σ2 + µǫ2h + tr[(Qx +Ψ)h˜
H
e h˜e] ≤ t [σ
2 + tr(QxhHb hb)] (16b)
 Ψ Qx
Qx µINa −Qx

  0 (16c)
tr(Qx) ≤ PS ,Qx  0, µ ≥ 0, (16d)
and the corresponding feasibility problem is then given by
Find Qx, µ,Ψ (17a)
s.t. σ2 + µǫ2h + tr[(Qx +Ψ)h˜
H
e h˜e] ≤ t [σ
2 + tr(QxhHb hb)] (17b)
 Ψ Qx
Qx µINa −Qx

  0 (17c)
tr(Qx) ≤ PS ,Qx  0, µ ≥ 0. (17d)
Then we can use the following bisection method by solving the convex feasibility problem at each step
until the interval that contains the optimal value converges:
Algorithm III.1: BISECTION METHOD FOR OBTAINING Qx
initialize: set an interval [l, u] such that the optimal value t∗ ∈ [l, u], and define a tolerance δ > 0.
while u− l > δ
do


let t = (l + u)/2.
Solve the feasibility problem in (17).
if (17) is feasible, then u = t; else l = t.
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7For problem (6), the initial lower bound l can be chosen as any infeasible value, for example l =
σ2
σ2+PS ||hb||2
, which is a lower bound since tr(QxhHb hb) ≤ ||Qx||2 · ||hb||2 ≤ PS ||hb||2. The upper bound
u can be any feasible value, for instance, we can set u = σ
2+µ0ǫ2h+tr[(Q0+Ψ0)h˜
H
e h˜e]
σ2+tr(Q0hHb hb)
, where µ0 = PS ,
Q0 =
PS
Na
I, and Ψ0 = Q0(µ0I−Q0)†Q0.
Note that the solution for the optimal covariance Q∗x obtained from Proposition 1 is already based on
a hidden worst-case channel mismatch e∗h. Next, we will explicitly express e∗h under the norm-bounded
constraint, which will be useful for the joint optimization in Section IV-B. The problem is formulated as
max
eh
(h˜e + eh)Q
∗
x(h˜e + eh)
H (18a)
s.t. ||eh|| ≤ ǫh. (18b)
This is a non-convex problem since we want to maximize a convex function. However, we can still obtain
the global optimum by solving its dual problem, as explained in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: The worst-case channel mismatch for problem (18) is given by e∗h = h˜eQ∗x(λI−Q∗x)†,
where λ is the solution of the following problem
max
λ≥0,γ
γ (19a)
s.t.

 λI−Q∗x Q∗xh˜He
h˜eQ
∗
x −h˜eQ
∗
xh˜
H
e − λǫ
2
h − γ

  0. (19b)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note that (19) is a semidefinite program (SDP) and hence can be solved efficiently using, for example,
the interior-point method [32].
Thus, for the MISO wiretap channel, the problem of finding the beamformer for the worst-case
eavesdropper channel can be converted from a non-convex maximin problem into a quasiconvex problem
that can be solved using the bisection method. Both the optimal covariance matrix and the corresponding
worst-case channel mismatch are obtained. In the following section, the MISO wiretap channel with a
cooperative jammer will be investigated.
IV. ROBUST COOPERATIVE JAMMING
We now consider the case when the Helper provides cooperative jamming to improve the secrecy rate.
According to the signal model in (2) and (3), the secrecy rate is
Rs = log2
(
1 +
hbQxh
H
b
gbQzg
H
b + σ
2
)
− log2
(
1 +
(h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜e + eh)
H
(g˜e + eg)Qz(g˜e + eg)H + σ2
)
. (20)
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8We will first consider the optimization problem under individual power constraints, i.e., Qx ∈ Qx =
{Qx : Qx  0, tr(Qx) ≤ PS} and Qz ∈ Qz = {Qz : Qz  0, tr(Qz) ≤ PJ}, and then we investigate a
more complicated case where a global power constraint tr(Qx) + tr(Qz) ≤ P is imposed.
When the ECSI is perfectly known, maximization of RS over both Qx and Qz requires an iterative
search [34]. However, it has also been shown that performance close to the optimal solution for the MISO
wiretap channel can be obtained by simply forcing the helper’s signal to be orthogonal to Bob’s channel.
Therefore, to simplify the solution when the ECSI is imperfect, we use a zero-forcing (ZF) constraint
on the jamming signal for the CJ problem, which is equivalent to requiring that QzgHb = 0. With the
ZF constraint, the maximization of RS with respect to Qz does not depend on Qx, although the optimal
Qx still depends on Qz. Thus, we will first optimize Qz and then the optimal Qx can be calculated.
A. Individual Power Constraint
For the case of perfect ECSI, the optimal Qz under the ZF constraint is given by
max
Qz∈Qz
geQzg
H
e (21a)
s.t. gbQzgHb = 0. (21b)
Lemma 1: The optimal covariance matrix Qz ∈ Qz for problem (21) is rank one.
Proof: See Appendix B.
According to Lemma 1, the optimal ZF jamming signal for the perfect ECSI case is also single-stream
beamforming, i.e. Qz = PJwwH , where w is the unit-normalized one-dimensional beamformer for the
Helper. We can rewrite problem (21) as
max
w
|gew|
2 (22a)
s.t. gbw = 0 (22b)
wHw = 1. (22c)
The solution for problem (22) is referred to as the null-steering beamformer and is given by [35]
w∗ =
(INh −Pgb)g
H
e
||(INh −Pgb)g
H
e ||
(23)
where Pgb = gHb (gbgHb )−1gb is the orthogonal projection onto the subspace spanned by gHb . The
optimal information covariance matrix Qx, similar to the perfect ECSI case discussed in Section III,
is rank one and the corresponding beamformer is the generalized eigenvector of the matrix pencil
(σ2I+ PSh
H
b hb, σ
2
zI+ PSh
H
e he) with the largest generalized eigenvalue, where σ2z = σ2 + geQzgHe .
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9For the case of imperfect ECSI, we still solve for the jamming covariance first, and the optimization
problem becomes
max
Qz∈Qz
min
eg∈Eg
(g˜e + eg)Qz(g˜e + eg)
H (24a)
s.t. gbQzgHb = 0. (24b)
Proposition 3: Problem (24) is equivalent to the following problem
max
Qz,µ,Ψ
tr[(Qz −Ψ)g˜He g˜e]− µǫ
2
g (25a)
s.t.

 Ψ Qz
Qz µINh +Qz

  0 (25b)
tr(Qz) ≤ PJ (25c)
Qz  0, µ ≥ 0 (25d)
gbQzg
H
b = 0. (25e)
Proof: See Appendix C.
Problem (25) is an SDP that consists of a linear objective function, together with a set of LMI
constraints. Therefore, we can solve this problem efficiently and obtain the optimal solution Q∗z . Note
that although eg does not explicitly appear in (25), the optimal robust covariance Q∗z is already based
on the hidden worst-case e∗g that can be expressed explicitly through the following problem
min
eg
(g˜e + eg)Q
∗
z(g˜e + eg)
H (26a)
s.t. ||eg|| ≤ ǫg. (26b)
This problem is similar to (18) with the difference that (26) is a convex problem and thus strong
duality holds for (26) and its dual. The worst-case channel mismatch is provided through the following
proposition.
Proposition 4: The worst channel mismatch for problem (26) is given by e∗g = −g˜eQ∗z(λI +Q∗z)−1,
where λ is the solution of the following SDP problem
max
λ≥0,γ
γ (27a)
s.t.

 λI+Q∗z Q∗zg˜He
g˜eQ
∗
z g˜eQ
∗
zg˜
H
e − λǫ
2
g − γ

  0. (27b)
October 27, 2018 DRAFT
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Proof: See Appendix D.
With solutions for Q∗z and e∗g, we can follow (5)-(6) and formulate the optimization problem over Qx
as
max
Qx∈Qx
min
eh∈Eh
σ2 + (g˜e + e
∗
g)Q
∗
z(g˜e + e
∗
g)
H + hbQxh
H
b
σ2 + (h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜e + eh)H
, (28)
which can be solved with the same procedure as in Section III.
B. Global Power Constraint
The previous sections only consider the design of the information covariance Qx and the jamming
covariance Qz under the assumption that their individual power constraints PS and PJ are fixed. This
section investigates the joint optimization over Qx, Qz and the power allocation between Alice and the
Helper, under the constraint that tr(Qx) + tr(Qz) = p1 + p2 ≤ P . As with the previous case, we will
assume a zero-forcing constraint for the helper’s jamming signal at Bob. We will first optimize the power
allocation for a pair of given Qx and Qz, and then we will provide an iterative algorithm that updates
both the beamformers and the power allocation.
First, for given Qx and Qz, let Qx = p1Q¯x and Qz = p2Q¯z where Q¯x and Q¯z are normalized such
that tr(Q¯x) = 1 and tr(Q¯z) = 1. Hence the maximization of the secrecy rate (20) with respect to p1 and
p2 is equivalent to
max
p1,p2≥0
p1p2c1c3 + p1c1σ
2 + p2c3σ
2 + σ4
p1c2 + p2c3 + σ2
(29a)
s.t. p1 + p2 ≤ P (29b)
where
c1 =hbQ¯xh
H
b (30)
c2 =(h˜e + eh)Q¯x(h˜e + eh)
H (31)
c3 =(g˜e + eg)Q¯z(g˜e + eg)
H . (32)
Since (29a) is a quadratic fractional function, the optimization problem is hard to solve directly. However,
we can use the single condensation method to solve this non-convex problem via a series of geometric
programming (GP) steps [36]. GP is a class of non-linear optimization problems that can be readily
turned into convex optimization problems, and hence a global optimum can be efficiently computed [37].
Before applying the single condensation method, we give the following lemma [36]:
October 27, 2018 DRAFT
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Lemma 2: Given a posynomial
f(x) =
m∑
i=1
ui(x) =
m∑
i=1
cix
β1i
1 x
β2i
2 · · · x
βni
n , (33)
where the exponents βji are arbitrary real numbers and ci are positive constants, the following inequality
holds:
f(x) ≥ f˜(x) =
m∏
i=1
(
ui(x)
αi
)αi
, (34)
where αi > 0 and
∑m
i=1 αi = 1. The inequality becomes an equality when αi =
ui(x0)
f(x0)
, in which case
the monomial f˜(x0) is the best local approximation of the posynomial f(x0) near x0.
Proof: We can rewrite f(x) as
f(x) =
m∑
i=1
αi
(
ui(x)
αi
)
(35)
≥
m∏
i=1
(
ui(x)
αi
)αi
(36)
where (36) holds according to the arithmetic-geometric mean inequality. When αi = ui(x0)f(x0) , we have
that αi (i = 1, · · · ,m) are all positive coefficients with
∑m
i=1 αi = 1, and the proof of equality is
straightforward by inserting αi back into f˜(x0).
Using Lemma 2, let
f(p1, p2) = p1p2c1c3 + p1c1σ
2 + p2c3σ
2 + σ4, (37)
and rewrite the numerator of (29a) as
f(p1, p2) =f˜(p1, p2)
=
(
p1p2c1c3
α1
)α1 (p1c1σ2
α2
)α2 (p2c3σ2
α3
)α3 (σ4
α4
)α4
(38)
where
α1 =
p1p2c1c3
f(p1, p2)
(39)
α2 =
p1c1σ
2
f(p1, p2)
(40)
α3 =
p2c3σ
2
f(p1, p2)
(41)
α4 =
σ4
f(p1, p2)
, (42)
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so the optimization problem of (29) becomes
min
p1,p2≥0
p1c2 + p2c3 + σ
2
f˜2(p1, p2)
(43a)
s.t. p1 + p2 ≤ P. (43b)
The optimization problem stated above can be readily converted into the standard form for geometric
programming problems, and (43a)-(43b) are posynomials of the GP problem. Therefore, the global optimal
solution can be efficiently obtained for problem (43). Next, we can use the single condensation method
to solve problem (29), and the main steps are outlined in Algorithm IV.1.
Algorithm IV.1: SINGLE CONDENSATION METHOD FOR GLOBAL POWER ALLOCATION
initialize: power allocation p(0)1 and p
(0)
2 .
iteration:
do


For iteration k, evaluate posynomial f(p(k−1)1 , p
(k−1)
2 ) according to (37).
Compute α(k)i according to (39)-(42) using p(k−1)1 , p(k−1)2 .
Condense posynomial f into monomial f˜ according to (38).
Solve problem (43) with a single GP.
Apply the resulting p(k)1 and p
(k)
2 into the first step and loop until convergence.
This successive optimization method is based on GP problems that can be solved using interior-point
methods with polynomial-time complexity, and it has been proven in [36] that the solution obtained
using successive approximations for the single condensation method will efficiently converge to a point
satisfying the KKT conditions of the original problem.
Now we can conduct the joint optimization that considers both the information/jamming covariances
and the power allocation between them. The main steps are outlined as follows:
1) Initilize p1 = p2 = P2 .
2) Let PS = p1, PJ = p2 and solve problem (24), (28) to obtain Q∗x, Q∗z, e∗h and e∗g.
3) Let Q¯x = Qxtr(Qx) , Q¯z =
Qz
tr(Qz)
and solve problem (29) with Algorithm IV.1.
4) Apply the resulting p1 and p2 to step 2 and loop until convergence.
Since in each iteration the objective functions are maximized and the secrecy rate is increased, and
since there is an upper bound for the secrecy rate (the case without an eavesdropper where the jamming
power is zero), the procedure will converge to an optimum. Our extensive numerical experiments, some
results of which are shown in Section VI, further illustrate that the global optimum is obtained through
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this procedure. Note that the non-robust counterpart of this procedure (where the CSI is assumed to be
perfect) is similar but with the difference that instead of obtaining the covariance matrices from the robust
maximin problems (24) and (28) in step 2, Q∗x and Q∗z are the solutions of the non-robust problems in
(21)-(23).
V. ROBUST TRANSMIT DESIGN WITH QOS CONSTRAINT
In this section, we consider a slightly different problem in which there is a fixed constraint on the signal
to interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) of the legitimate link, so that the problem reduces to minimizing
the SINR at the eavesdropper for the worst channel mismatch, under a given power constraint. As we
will see, the addition of the SINR constraint actually simplifies the robust solution.
A. Robust Direct Transmission
When the Helper is silent, the optimization problem for the perfect-ECSI case is
min
Qx∈Qx
heQxh
H
e (44a)
s.t.
hbQxh
H
b
σ2
≥ γt, (44b)
where γt is the desired target SINR at Bob. When the channel mismatch is considered, the optimization
problem is formulated as
min
Qx∈Qx
max
eh∈Eh
(h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜e + eh)
H (45a)
s.t.
hbQxh
H
b
σ2
≥ γt. (45b)
Comparing problem (45) with (5), we see that (45) simplifies the fractional expression in (5) by intro-
ducing an extra affine inequality constraint. Therefore, the procedure for solving (5) can be applied to
solve (45), and we have the similar result that (45) is equivalent to the following optimization problem:
min
Qx,µ,Ψ
µǫ2h + tr[(Qx +Ψ)h˜
H
e h˜e] (46a)
s.t.

 Ψ Qx
Qx µINa −Qx

  0 (46b)
tr(Qx) ≤ P (46c)
Qx  0, µ ≥ 0 (46d)
tr(QxhHb hb) ≥ σ
2γt. (46e)
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Unlike the quasiconvex problem in Proposition 1 that requires a bisection method, (46) is an SDP with
a linear objective function, and thus can be solved efficiently.
Note that by exploiting a similar form in (11), problem (45) is also equivalent to
min
Qx∈Qx,µ≥||Qx||2
µǫ2h + h˜eQxh˜
H
e + h˜eQx(µINa −Qx)
†Qxh˜
H
e (47a)
s.t.
hbQxh
H
b
σ2
≥ γt. (47b)
Denoting Q˜x = Qxtr(Qx) , and based on the observation that h˜eQxh˜
H
e ≥ 0, h˜eQx(µINa−Qx)
†Qxh˜
H
e ≥ 0, a
relaxed solution for Qx of (47) can be obtained by steering the eigenvectors of Qx to maximize hbQ˜xhHb
subject to a zero-forcing constraint Q˜xhHe = 0, while allocating the eigenvalues of Qx to satisfy the
SINR constraint. Thus the relaxed optimization becomes
max
Q˜x
hbQ˜xh
H
b (48a)
s.t. h˜eQ˜xh˜e
H
= 0, (48b)
and Q∗x =
σ2γt
hbQ˜∗xh
H
b
Q˜∗x. Note that (48) is also a relaxed optimization problem for its non-robust counterpart
in (44), because when there is enough transmit power to meet the SINR demand, Alice will choose a
beamformer that will null the signal at Eve while aligning it as close to hHb as possible. Therefore, in
this case, the non-robust and robust covariance matrices, and thus the corresponding worst-case SINRs,
are expected to be very close to each other. This will be illustrated by the simulation results of Section
VI.
B. Robust Cooperative Jamming
Unlike the previous section, in the cooperative jamming case with a QoS constraint, we will not need
to introduce a ZF constraint on the jamming signal from the helper to simplify the problem. Note also that
we only consider the global power constraint scenario, since the generalization of the proposed solution
to the case of individual power constraints is straightforward.
For the joint optimization of Qx and Qz under the QoS constraint, the optimization problem is given
by
min
Qx,Qz
max
eh,eg
(h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜e + eh)
H
(g˜e + eg)Qz(g˜e + eg)H + σ2
(49a)
s.t. tr(Qx) + tr(Qz) ≤ P (49b)
|eh| ≤ ǫh, |eg| ≤ ǫg (49c)
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hbQxh
H
b
gbQzg
H
b + σ
2
≥ γt. (49d)
Unlike the global power allocation problem discussed in Section IV-B, the QoS constraint in problem
(49) simplifies the fractional quadratic expression in (29) into a linear fractional form with respect to Qx
and Qz. Thus we can directly obtain the solution via the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Problem (49) is equivalent to the following problem
min
Qx,Qz,Ψ,Φ,µ,ν
µǫ2h + tr[(Qx +Ψ)h˜
H
e h˜e]
σ2 − νǫ2g + tr[(Qz −Φ)g˜He g˜e]
(50a)
s.t.

 Ψ Qx
Qx µINa −Qx

  0 (50b)

 Φ Qz
Qz νINh +Qz

  0 (50c)
tr(Qx) + tr(Qz) ≤ P (50d)
Qx  0,Qz  0, µ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0 (50e)
tr(QxhHb hb) ≥ γt(tr(Qzg
H
b gb) + σ
2). (50f)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Problem (50) is also an SDP with a quasiconvex objective function, a set of LMIs and affine inequalities.
Thus it can be solved via the bisection method discussed in Section III. Note that for some cases when
the SINR requirement at Bob can not be met for a given power constraint, the optimization problem will
not be feasible and the transmission is assumed to be in outage. For the non-robust counterpart of the
above QoS-constrained cooperative jamming problem, Alice will still use the solution of problem (44),
and the Helper will use the remainder of the power for ZF jamming (same as problem (21)), since the
Helper has no information about the channel mismatch.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some numerical examples on the secrecy rate performance of the robust
transmission schemes studied in the paper. For all examples, we assume Alice and the Helper both have
four antennas, i.e. Na = Nh = 4, while Bob and Eve each has one. The channel matrices are assumed
to be composed of independent, zero-mean Gaussian random variables with unit variance. All results are
calculated based on an average of 1000 independent trials. The background noise power is assumed to
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be the same at Bob and Eve, σ2b = σ2e = 1, and the transmit power P is defined in dB relative to the
noise power.
We will examine the performance of the robust direct transmission (DT) scheme and the robust
cooperative jamming (CJ) scheme under various power constraints, channel error bounds and QoS
constraints. For purposes of comparison, we also examine the non-robust generalized eigenvector schemes
(which will be referred to as GEV DT) discussed in Section III , and the non-robust DT and CJ schemes
discussed in Sections III-V.
Fig. 1 shows the worst-case secrecy rate as a function of transmit power under an individual power
constraint, assuming PS = PJ and the channel mismatch is ǫ2h = ǫ2g = 1.5. In general, when there exists
channel mismatch, we see that the robust design for DT and CJ produces better performance in terms
of the worst-case secrecy rate compared to their non-robust counterparts. Note that the non-robust CJ
scheme, although possessing twice the available power as that for DT, performs even worse than the
robust DT scheme for low transmit powers. This is due to the fact that the performance of the non-robust
CJ scheme is degraded not only by the channel error between Alice and Eve, but also by that between
the Helper and Eve.
In Fig. 2, we compare the performance of the robust CJ scheme under both global and individual power
constraints. In this case, we assume the global power limit P is 10dB, PS and PJ are the individual power
constraints for Alice and the Helper respectively, and PS +PJ = P . The benefit of having the flexibility
associated with a global power constraint over fixed individual power constraint is clearly evident. Also
it can be seen that the proposed joint optimization procedure for the global power constraint achieves
the optimal worst-case secrecy rate. When ǫ2h increases, a larger fraction of the transmit power must be
devoted to jamming in order to reach the higher secrecy rate.
The impact of the channel mismatch on the secrecy rate of the different schemes is presented in Fig. 3.
The transmit power fraction for the robust CJ scheme is also plotted, and a global power constraint is
used in this case. We assume P is 5dB, and the channel mismatch ǫ2h = ǫ2g. It can be observed that
when the channel mismatch is zero, a jamming signal is not necessary, and all schemes achieve the same
secrecy rate. However, when ǫ2h and ǫ2g increase, the robustness of the CJ scheme is more obvious, and
the jamming fraction of the total transmit power also increases. Also it can be seen that the worst-case
secrecy rate is much lower for the non-robust CJ scheme due to the fact that it is impacted by the channel
mismatch from both the link between Alice and Eve, and the link between the Helper and Eve.
Next, we consider examples for the case where a desired SINR constraint is imposed at Bob. P is
assumed to be 10dB in these examples. In Fig. 4, the channel mismatch is given by ǫ2h = ǫ2g = 0.5,
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and we plot the measured SINR at Bob and Eve with an increasing SINR constraint at Bob. Since the
SINR constraint is met in all cases, the curves for Bob all coincide. We see that in this QoS constraint
scenario, the robust CJ scheme still shows a significant performance improvement by suppressing the
SINR at Eve. An interesting observation is that the robust DT scheme for minimizing the worst-case
SINR at Eve shows almost the same performance as the non-robust DT method, which is consistent
with the analytical prediction discussed in Section V-A. Therefore, the worst-case optimization for DT is
unnecessary in this case. For the CJ schemes, when the SINR requirement at Bob is higher, more power
will be allocated to Alice and less power will be used for jamming. Therefore, the performance of the
CJ schemes approaches that of DT schemes.
In Fig. 5, the impact of increasing ǫ2h and ǫ2g is depicted. In this example, the desired SINR constraint
at Bob is set to be 10dB. We see that when no channel mismatch exists, all schemes give zero SINR
at Eve while maintaining the QoS constraint at Bob, and in such cases the use of artificial noise (CJ)
is unnecessary. Also we can observe that although the SINR at Eve increases for all of the methods as
the channel mismatch becomes larger, the benefits of using robust cooperative jamming over the other
algorithms is obvious.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied robust transmit designs for MISO wiretap channels with imperfect ECSI.
Robust transmit covariance matrices were obtained for both direct transmission and cooperative jamming
scenarios, based on worst-case secrecy rate maximization. For the case of individual power constraints,
we transformed the non-convex optimization problem into a quasiconvex problem. For the global power
constraint case, we proposed an algorithm for joint optimization of the transmit covariance matrices and
power allocation. In addition, we also obtained robust transmit covariance matrices for the scenario where
a QoS constraint is imposed at the legitimate receiver. The benefits of the robust designs were illustrated
through numerical results. We conclude that although cooperative jamming is not helpful when perfect
ECSI is available under a global power constraint, the worst-case secrecy rate can be increased and the
SINR at Eve can be lowered by using jamming support from a helper when the ECSI is imperfect,
provided that robust beamforming is employed.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Problem (18) can be rewritten as
min
eh
− ehQ
∗
xe
H
h − 2Re(h˜eQ
∗
xe
H
h )− h˜eQ
∗
xh˜
H
e (51a)
s.t. eheHh ≤ ǫ
2
h. (51b)
This is a non-convex problem since its Hessian is negative semidefinite, i.e. −Q∗x  0. The Lagrangian
of this problem is
L(eh, λ) =− ehQ
∗
xe
H
h − 2Re(h˜eQ
∗
xe
H
h )− h˜eQ
∗
xh˜
H
e + λ(ehe
H
h − ǫ
2
h)
=eh(λI−Q
∗
x)e
H
h + 2Re(−h˜eQ
∗
xe
H
h )− h˜eQ
∗
xh˜
H
e − λǫ
2
h (52)
where λ ≥ 0 and the dual function is given by
g(λ) = inf
eh
L(eh, λ)
=

 −h˜eQ
∗
xh˜
H
e − λǫ
2
h − h˜eQ
∗
x(λI−Q
∗
x)
†Q∗xh˜
H
e λI−Q
∗
x  0,Q
∗
xh˜
H
e ∈ R(λI −Q
∗
x)
−∞, otherwise
(53)
where the unconstrained minimization of L(eh, λ) with respect to eh is achieved when eh = h˜eQ∗x(λI−
Q∗x)
†
. The dual problem is thus
max
λ
− h˜eQ
∗
xh˜
H
e − λǫ
2
h − h˜eQ
∗
x(λI−Q
∗
x)
†Q∗xh˜
H
e (54a)
s.t. λI−Q∗x  0, Q
∗
xh˜
H
e ∈ R(λI−Q
∗
x). (54b)
Using a Schur complement, the dual problem becomes the following SDP
max
λ≥0,γ
γ (55a)
s.t.

 λI−Q∗x Q∗xh˜He
h˜eQ
∗
x −h˜eQ
∗
xh˜
H
e − λǫ
2
h − γ

  0. (55b)
Note that (51) is usually called a trust region subproblem (TRS), and it has been proven that strong
duality holds for TRS although the objective function is non-convex [38]. Thus the optimal value of (51)
and (55) are the same.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Since gbQzgHb is nonnegative, we rewrite the equality constraint as gbQzgHb ≤ ε, where ε > 0 is a
arbitrarily small number. Denoting f(Qz) = 1geQzgHe , the Lagrangian of problem (21) is
L(Qz, λ,Θ, ν) = f(Qz) + λ(tr(Qz)− PJ)− tr(ΘQz) + νgbQzgHb (56)
where λ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, and Θ  0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint
Qz ≥ 0. Note that the objective function in (21) is linear, and there exist strictly feasible points that
satisfy both the inequality and equality constraints (e.g. Qz = PJNhwwH , where w is a normalized vector
orthogonal to gHb ). Therefore, according to Slater’s theorem, the primal and dual optimal points of (21)
satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
tr(Qz) ≤ PJ ,Qz ≥ 0,gbQzgHb ≤ ε (57)
λ ≥ 0,Θ  0 (58)
tr(ΘQz) = 0 (59)
λ(tr(Qz)− PJ ) = 0 (60)
Θ = −
gHe ge
(geQzgHe )
2
+ λI+ νgbg
H
b . (61)
For the case that λ = 0, according to (61), we know that Θ has a negative eigenvalue, which contradicts
the fact that Θ is positive semidefinite. Thus λ can only be positive. For λ > 0, according to (61) and
since ν ≥ 0, Θ has at least N − 1 positive eigenvalues, i.e. rank(Θ) ≥ N − 1.
Lemma 3 ( [39]): Given two N ×N positive semidefinite matrices A and B with eigenvalues λi(A)
and λi(B), respectively, arranged in non-increasing order, then
tr(AB) ≥
N∑
i=1
λi(A)λN−i+1(B). (62)
Combining Lemma 3 and (59), assuming λi(Θ) and λi(Qz) are eigenvalues of Θ and Qz, respectively,
in non-increasing order, we have
tr(ΘQz) = 0 ≥
N∑
i=1
λi(Θ)λN−i+1(Qz). (63)
Due to the fact that Θ and Qz are both positive semidefinite matrices, we have
N∑
i=1
λi(Θ)λN−i+1(Qz) = 0. (64)
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Thus we can conclude that rank(Θ) 6= N , since otherwise all eigenvalues of Qz are zero and no jamming
signals are transmitted. Combining this conclusion and the above observation that rank(Θ) ≥ N − 1 ,
we can conclude that rank(Θ) = N − 1. Therefore, according to (64), we have
λi(Qz)

 > 0, i = 1= 0, i = 2, · · · , N, (65)
which indicates that rank(Qz) = 1, and the proof is complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. The maximin problem (24) can be transformed to
max
Qz∈Qz,v
v (66a)
s.t. (g˜e + eg)Qz(g˜e + eg)H ≥ v (66b)
ege
H
g ≤ ǫ
2
g. (66c)
The constraints in (66) can also be expressed as
egQze
H
g + 2Re(g˜eQzeHg ) + g˜eQzg˜He − v ≥ 0 (67a)
− ege
H
g + ǫ
2
g ≥ 0. (67b)
According to the S-procedure, there exists an eg ∈ CNh satisfying both of the above inequalities if and
only if there exists a µ ≥ 0 such that
 µINh +Qz Qzg˜He
g˜eQz g˜eQzg˜
H
e − µǫ
2
g − v

  0. (68)
Applying the Schur complement, we can rewrite (68) as
− µǫ2g + g˜eQzg˜
H
e − g˜eQz(µINh +Qz)
†Qzg˜
H
e ≥ v. (69)
Therefore, the maximin problem (24) becomes
max
Qz∈Qz,µ≥0
−µǫ2g + g˜eQzg˜
H
e − g˜eQz(µINh +Qz)
†Qzg˜
H
e , (70)
which is equivalent to
max
Qz∈Qz,µ≥0,Ψ
− µǫ2g + g˜eQzg˜
H
e − g˜eΨg˜
H
e (71)
s.t. Qz(µINh +Qz)
†Qz Ψ. (72)
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Next, we use the Schur complement to turn the above constraint into an LMI. The maximization problem
is then given by
max
Qz ,µ,Ψ
− µǫ2g + tr[(Qz −Ψ)g˜
H
e g˜e] (73a)
s.t.

 Ψ Qz
Qz µINh +Qz

  0 (73b)
tr(Qz) ≤ PJ (73c)
Qz  0, µ ≥ 0, (73d)
and the proof is complete.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The proof is along the same line as that in Appendix A. Problem (26) can be rewritten as
min
eg
egQ
∗
ze
H
g + 2Re(g˜eeHg ) + g˜eQ∗zg˜He (74a)
s.t. egeHg ≤ ǫ
2
g, (74b)
with the Lagrangian
L(eg, λ) = eg(λI+Q
∗
z)e
H
g + 2Re(g˜eQ∗zeHg ) + g˜eQ∗zg˜He − λǫ2g (75)
where λ ≥ 0. It can be verified that the minimum of L(eg, λ) with respect to eg is achieved when
eg = −g˜eQ
∗
z(λI +Q
∗
z)
−1
, and hence the dual problem is
max
λ
g˜eQ
∗
zg˜
H
e − λǫ
2
g − g˜eQ
∗
z(λI+Q
∗
z)
−1Q∗zg˜
H
e (76a)
s.t. λI+Q∗z  0, Q
∗
zg˜
H
e ∈ R(λI +Q
∗
z). (76b)
Using a Schur complement, the dual problem becomes the following SDP
max
λ≥0,γ
γ (77a)
s.t.

 λI+Q∗z Q∗zg˜He
g˜eQ
∗
z g˜eQ
∗
zg˜
H
e − λǫ
2
g − γ

  0, (77b)
which completes the proof.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The maximin problem (49) can be transformed to
min
QxQz ,v,t
v
t
(78a)
s.t. (h˜e + eh)Qx(h˜e + eh)H ≤ v (78b)
σ2 + (g˜e + eg)Qz(g˜e + eg)
H ≥ t (78c)
tr(Qx) + tr(Qz) ≤ P (78d)
|eh| ≤ ǫh (78e)
|eg| ≤ ǫg (78f)
hbQxh
H
b = γt(gbQzg
H
b + σ
2). (78g)
Using the S-procedure similarly as in (8)-(12) for (78b), (78e) and for (78c), (78f), problem (78) can be
rewritten as
min
Qx,Qz,µ≥0,ν≥0
µǫ2h + h˜eQxh˜
H
e + h˜eQx(µINa −Qx)
†Qxh˜
H
e
σ2 − νǫ2g + g˜eQzg˜
H
e − g˜eQz(νINh +Qz)
†Qzg˜
H
e
, (79)
which is equivalent to
min
Qx,Qz,µ≥0,ν≥0,Ψ,Φ
µǫ2h + h˜eQxh˜
H
e + h˜eΨh˜
H
e
σ2 − νǫ2g + g˜eQzg˜
H
e − g˜eΦg˜
H
e
(80a)
s.t. Qx(µINa −Qx)
†Qx  Ψ (80b)
Qz(µINh +Qz)
†Qz  Φ. (80c)
Using the Schur complement for the above constraints, the expression in (50) can be obtained.
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Fig. 1. Worst-case secrecy rate vs. transmit power, with individual power constraint, ǫ2h = ǫ2g = 1.5.
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Fig. 2. Worst-case secrecy rate vs. transmit power fraction, P = 10dB.
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Fig. 3. Worst-case secrecy rate and transmit power fraction vs. channel mismatch, P = 5dB.
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